Operation Harvest: The IRA's Border Campaign

Introduction

After the Irish War of independence 1919-1921 the Island of Ireland was partitioned between the de-facto independent twenty-six county Irish-Free State and six county Northern Ireland which remained within in the United Kingdom. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which fought against British forces during the war, split between those who supported the Anglo-Irish treaty giving Ireland at least some form of independence and those who rejected anything less than a complete separation with Britain with an Irish Republic. This led to the Irish Civil War (1922-23) in which the pro-treaty forces prevailed and the treaty enforced, along with partition. The IRA was forced into obscurity for the next 30 years as they attempted to undermine both the Irish-Free state and Northern Ireland. In the late 1950s the IRA emerged from the shadows in attempt to secure a united Ireland and destabilize the North by launching guerrilla attacks against the Irish Border. The Border Campaign was an important chapter in the history of Northern Ireland, which is often overlooked, as it taught many within the IRA the limits of their capabilities and inform their strategy when the Troubles erupted in 1969.

Out of the shadows

When Ireland declared itself a Republic in 1949 and Dublin’s strategy of ending partition by using diplomatic and economic pressure had seemingly failed. This caused Irish Republicans to feel they had to take matters into their own hands by using violence to finally unite the Island. There was also a fear by IRA leadership that militant factions may splinter if some sort of action wasn’t taken. Small electoral victories by its political wing, Sinn Fein, also contributed to a belief that the IRA had some level of support by Irish nationalists in the North who felt they had been abandoned by Dublin even as the Northern Irish government had become repressive against the Catholic minority.  IRA strategist Sean Cronin devised a plan codenamed Operation Harvest in which the IRA would use tactics from the Irish War of Independence. Four flying columns would strike security infrastructure along the Border repeatedly before retreating back into the Republic before they could be captured or attacked by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). They believed this would put enough pressure and destabilize the Northern government enough to end partition and unify with the Republic even though the attacks would be mostly confined to the poor Catholic areas in the west. Even from Operation Harvest’s conception it seemed flimsy. It failed to take into consideration that even during the War of Independence guerilla tactics in Ulster had not worked due to hostility from the majority Protestant population or that Unionists were going to protect their interests as strongly as they had in the 1920s.

The Campaign Commences

The operation began on the 11th of December 1956 as the IRA launched thirteen attacks across the Border. Some of these included a BBC transmitter in Derry, in Magherafelt the courthouse was burned down, three bridges by Lough Erne had holes blown in them and three RUC barracks were bombed and fired upon. This early phase was successful thanks to the element of surprise and the aid of long, dark nights. This marked a small highpoint which would quickly end as both authorities in the North and the Republic became alerted to IRA’s activities and began to mobilize. In an attack on an RUC Barracks in Brookeborough on New Years Eve two IRA volunteers were killed, Sean South and Fergal O’Hanlon. The deaths of these two young men sparked a brief rise of public sympathy throughout the Republic for the IRA as many viewed them as martyrs and their funeral processions were attended by thousands. Their deaths also contributed to Sinn Fein winning four seats in elections to Dail Eireann, the Irish Parliament.

Failure

Despite this pressure the Irish government did not bow to public opinion and continued to arrest many IRA members. This meant that the most important aspect of the IRA’s strategy had been undermined as they could not seek sanctuary in the Republic after launching attacks. The Northern government also came down hard on the IRA. The Special Powers Act was used to intern suspect members of the IRA and organised RUC patrols made it increasingly harder for the IRA to launch attacks. In 1957 there were 342 attacks but by 1960 there were only 26. The IRA had also overestimated the support they had among the Catholic in Northern Ireland at that moment in time. Most were more concerned with their own daily issues rather than fighting with the police. With out the support of the people they claimed to be liberating the campaign was impossible to continue and the morale to continue fighting was eroded further by the loss of Sinn Feins seats in the Westminster elections in 1959. In February 1962, seeing no hope of success and with much of its personal interned in prisons North and South, the IRA called an end to hostilities.

Results and Legacy

What were the results of the campaign and how did it effect the IRA’s strategies going into the Troubles? There was a small loss of life, compared with the troubles with 6 RUC dead and 11 Republicans. The campaign had failed at its principle aim to destabilize the Northern Irish government and end partition, if anything it made Unionists more resolute in their defence. It did however cost the Northern Irish government huge sums of finance with £10 million spent on more security. It caused a rupture within the leadership of the IRA between those who favoured a more political approach against conservatives who believed in the “Armed Struggle” which would eventually lead to the split between the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA in the late 1960s. Despite Operation Harvest being a failure, the IRA gained key insights. Firstly, they now knew that their attempts to use flying column tactics to attack security forces head on were no longer viable and had even been counterproductive as they had led to too many personal being captured. Secondly, it showed how fighting in rural areas was inconsequential and that urban centres such as Belfast needed to be exploited if it wanted to destabilize the government. Finaly, it emphasised the importance of some level of support among Catholics in Northern Ireland if the IRA was going to be successful. South and O’Hanlon had shown once again how important martyrs had been in the Irish republican movement to gain widespread support just as it had been in 1916. This resulted in IRA propaganda using later British atrocities such as Bloody Sunday in 1972 or the deaths of the hunger strikers in 1981 to significantly increase support and recruit volunteers. The Border Campaign would quickly become overshadowed by the Troubles but remains important to those studying the evolution of Irish Republican strategy in the twentieth century.